Ch 10 excerpt 1 of 2 : Meritocracy?

 

Ch 10

Policy in Context

 

‘Distributed responsibility is the problem. One person gives the order, another carries it out. One can say they didn’t pull the trigger, the other that they were just doing what they were told, and everyone lets themselves off the hook.’¹

 We continue to focus on issues that create content for writing and argument in Singapore. How we understand and respond to events that affect us make up the context of our everyday life issues. In Singapore, information and meaning has long been interpreted and presented by one single source – the government. Easy to do when you have total control of information systems. But in a growing and wealthy young nation-state that is maturing in an increasingly interconnected world, such control can ultimately be self-defeating for the country.Let’s look at how some of these controls have worked out.

 Meritocracy

has been called the Singapore dream; a main principle of government; a state sponsored narrative; and, more formally stated, an ideological resource for justifying authoritarian government and its pro-capitalist orientations, with thanks to Kenneth Paul Tan for that last one!² As generally understood in Singapore, meritocracy has sounded great as a fair shake for all. It claims to offer mobility across inherent and unfair givens, so that in spite of such factors a good hard worker has a fair chance to climb the ladder of success, regardless of ethnic differences and socio-economic background. Unfortunately, it hasn’t quite worked out that way. How come?  

An idea can sound wonderful; and then fail, abysmally. No matter how much we talk about system and structure, it is the people involved who sustain a system and who may not allow for its revision and improvement. Easy to blame a system, tough to take it on. You come up against its defenders and may find that they’re defending their interests.  Systems are often imperfect, but they can be tinkered with and improved - imagineering, as a friend once said to me. Use your imagination and engineer your way there! But the people in control are making the choices, and the choices reflect their values, associations, and preferences. They may claim that the system is insufficient, but it is they who often fall back on it and support it, as is expedient.

Our 1^st Generation leadership talked of meritocracy as a civil service principle - that every officer in the civil service should feel that he could get right to the top if he was sufficiently ‘meritorian’ and that public servants should advance on the basis of merit, and not connections. Thus spoke S. Rajaratnam, Lee Kuan Yew and C. V. Devan Nair in their time; Devan Nair spoke of Singapore’s outstanding characteristic as one of high social mobility, not an aristocracy of pedigree, but one of talent.³ OK. But what happened?

Let’s examine a key policy move as an example  – promotion in the Singapore Armed Forces (the SAF), based on Shell Corporation’s staff appraisal and promotion system of current estimated potential (CEP) and a combination of helicopter vision, analytical power, imagination and reality. (HAIR) .⁴ But who estimates potential and how are evaluations done?

Before Goh Chok Tong was chosen to follow Lee Kuan Yew as Prime Minister, he was CEO of Singapore’s national shipping line, Neptune Orient. In later years that position was assigned to an ex-SAF General. Then the line began to sink, as it were, and it was sold to a French conglomerate who were able to float it profitably, in a year’s time. The General who was appointed CEO was a product of a CEP & HAIR practice but was unable to keep the Company afloat. Next, the General was made CEO of Singapore Press Holdings. Unfortunately, that did not do well either and needed a government bail-out. In achieving ‘generalness’, George Yeo served all of 43 days as a ‘General’ and Lee Hsien Loong some 83 days as a ‘Brigadier General’ before leaving for the civil service.⁵ Ummmm. In my opinion, such a brief amount of ‘experience’ amounts to little more than a paper ‘General.’ Leadership attributed and delegated, undoubtedly. But what would result? Why was holding a high-ranking military appointment seen as a source of all-rounder capability? How did such a policy begin?   

Samuel Ling’s ‘An Aristocracy of Armed Talent’ uses a small sample of SAFOS Officer data (Singapore Armed Forces Overseas Scholars) but it does provide enough information to draw some useful conclusions.⁶ For one, Ling gives some history on the emergence of the ‘scholar’ officer as a government investment in leadership potential, where candidates would work in the Armed Forces and then be transferred into the civil service. Great crossover functionality. The ‘scholar’ notion possibly derives from the historical tradition of scholars in ancient China who took state examinations and were given ranked civil positions per their level of achievement. But that was history. The situations differ. Has it been a success?  

Leadership in the armed forces performed well in its first two decades, and then slowly began to dissipate. Winston Choo headed the Armed Forces for almost 20 years with no issues, no problems. But after that, trends changed. Annual promotion exercises ensured quick upward mobility for many. Senior rank came easily. And senior officers were promoted quickly. It became smooth sailing to reach the rank of General in peacetime with no combat experience, training exercises notwithstanding. And as the Armed Forces grew, the manpower establishment in use mapped out rank as provided for by position. Makes me think of our Ministry of Manpower, as opposed to a Ministry of Labor. Presentation and image (optics, these days!) required more than having a Captain serve as Chief of Navy. We soon had Rear Admirals. And so on. No question that they did their training and successfully fulfilled their assigned posting requirements. But promotions were rapid. Hence the number of Generals. None of them stayed in one appointment for very long.⁷ Here also began the ‘jack of all trades, master of none’ syndrome that the current government perpetuates. Some have called it job rotation so that there is no chance to build and develop, whether in skills, relationships or both.  

 It makes you wonder about that conversation a long time ago that Sam Ling makes reference to, when Goh Keng Swee, then Defence Minister, and Lee Onn Pong, then Head of MINDEF, (the Ministry of Defence) talked about a possible glut of senior officers and how such folk would need to be moved into the civil service.⁸ That was a long time ago, and whether that notion has remained in the ranks of our politicians, I can’t say. But the patterns are clear. Rapid promotion and equally rapid transfer to the civil service.

Nevertheless, Sam Ling also says that military personnel must be highly compensated because their skillset is non-transferable. And that makes no sense to me. What would be the point of a transfer into the civil service then? There seems to be no reason given for such a conclusion in his work. A cross-referenced article on his book says that ‘the book also notes that military personnel must be highly compensated because their skillset is non-transferable, but apparently not non-transferable enough to prevent employment in government roles or affiliated entities.’⁹ This inadvertently demonstrates the risk of transferring folk who are untrained and unskilled into situations where specific non-military skills are required from day one. Meritocracy? Doesn’t seem like it. Seems like these transfers from the military to the civil service were made at huge risk and at substantial cost  over a fairly broad spectrum.

What is clearly stated is the expectation amongst the political leadership that these were all SAFOS candidates, chosen from select schools, and once in the SAF, had been sent abroad to return as overseas trained ‘scholars’, the cream of the crop. Expected to be promoted beyond the rank of Colonel. Able to do anything asked of them. Good to believe that, perhaps, but what was it based on? Appears to be a mix of personal and academic preference, as versus a genuine appraisal of potential. Reality has a way of causing expectations to hit the dust!

So, in the business of making ex-military Generals into civil leaders, CEP and HAIR didn’t quite deliver for the government. This makes our Samuel ask at one point ‘How can an individual be identified in their late teens and groomed for a position they would hold only in their late 30s or early 40s?  Does this not contradict the oft mentioned practice of meritocracy?¹⁰

Yes, it does. It demonstrates preference. And it indicates that this notion of meritocracy is as much political narrative as anything else. There is no such system. If there is, show the philosophy that undergirds it, or how the system was created, who created it, how it works in different structures and how it is applied therein. Did we work this out, point by point in Parliament, so its constituent parts were clearly settled? Otherwise, a quote Sam Ling refers to on CEP is prophetic – ‘CEP is not an exact science; it is subjective and depends on who fights for who’ (sponsorship!) and ‘there is no greater influence on CEP than the level of education.’ So we set ourselves up then. And another observation on all this kicks in from another reference quote – ‘scholars are smart but is it merely academic smart?’¹¹ A very fair question. Not very sharply stated, though. What it implies is that while there may be some academic knowledge, the point at which the rubber hits the road is where theory needs to blossom into successful application and execution, in working practice. Sadly enough, the immediate downside in the SAF itself is the colloquial terminology used to describe officers, which uses ‘scholar’- officer versus ‘farmer’ officer or non-scholar distinctions! Wonder where that came from?

Sam Ling also tries to identify ‘who came from where’ by looking at SAFOS awards – SAF overseas scholarships; these were dominated by RI - Raffles Institution students mostly (44%), with a little from Hwa Chong JC (Junior College) and National JC. What of the rest? (Anyone ever ask how come RI can still use the word ‘institution’ when that is purportedly a gazetted word?)¹² Apparently, students from other JC’s didn’t quite make the grade. What grade, and how graded, and who decided? Meritocracy, huh? Good questions. While the General who served as the CEO of NOL might have come from an ‘exclusive’ school, and might have been a good student, and a preferred candidate for making General, none of these ‘pre-conditions’ guaranteed the ability to deliver! So, what is it really? Perhaps demonstrated reality down the road shows the truth of what the thing is?¹³ Kakinang? (Chinese Hokkien dialect, mixed with Malay = the singlish phrase ‘kaki-nang; or (kaki/foot; nang/people) foot people ie all of the same footprint or so….i.e. a specific group with common identifiers.

The Home Affairs & Law Minister Kasi recently said that in Singapore we prefer some training before a Ministerial appointment and referred to Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, DPM Lawrence Wong and Minister Desmond Lee as examples. But is it really a matter of training or of having the right connections? ¹⁴ One is son to the first Prime Minister. Lawrence Wong served as Lee Hsien Loong’s Principal Private Secretary. And Desmond Lee’s father is Lee Yock Suan, former MP and Cabinet Minister. And what of the ex-Generals who were given civil appointments – what training did they receive for such appointments? How many ended up in the LTA (Land Transport Authority)? And how did Tan See Leng become a full Minister straight off, post-election? And then start commenting about the social compact as though he knew what he was talking about? Ah, but that was an exception, I’m sure. The contradictions come quick and fast. What is being said cannot be easily accepted at face value. Not anymore.

The Education Minister once bemoaned the fact that meritocracy was having a hard time, as he said, ‘…in the last few years meritocracy has taken on negative overtones due to its association with elitism, and there has been an ongoing debate over social inequality and stratification in society.’¹⁵ Spoken like a true principal private secretary. And corrected very bravely by one honest and forthright citizen, who said……’the answer to why meritocracy in Singapore has gone wrong and why faith in meritocracy has weakened among the people is because the spouses of ministers and military men with zero private sector experience are appointed to lead GLCs.’¹⁶ (a GLC is a government linked corporation).

Once again, the official narrative does not fit the experienced reality. Given the reach of the Internet, data is easily fact-checked. And Kenneth Jeyaretnam has repeated his concerns over spousal appointments and undisclosed salary figures often enough so that most have heard about it, denial notwithstanding.¹⁷ No one challenges it. Different narratives exist, and it is a matter of accepting or rejecting such offerings.

But we are pointed to a significant preferential reality – one that comes out in support of a close circle of political acquaintances, and so we have a Prime Minister, his spouse, and Ministers – children of connected persons – Ministers, Principal private secretaries and such, in Hsien Loong, Ho Ching his wife who headed Temasek, Desmond Lee, Lawrence Wong, Grace Fu, Heng Swee Keat. There is no problem with such appointments if meritocracy is upheld as an efficiency principle i.e. if you can handle the instrument you take the solo in the concert; if you can’t, beware the flat notes and the weak delivery….. costly errors to a performer that badly affect the audience, the promoter, and the experience that has been invested in; here, to the taxpayer.

Like that marvelous incident of a ‘high profile’ rubbish bin center that cost $410,000.00 for consultancy fees (ah, it was being built for a superstar…?) and for its construction a further $470,000.00. MCCY – the Ministry of Culture, Community & Youth, did acknowledge that there should have been “more detailed documentation to explain clearly the scope and complexity of the consultancy service.”¹⁸ Scope and complexity? As Bugs Bunny said, it is to laugh. What degree of scope and complexity could possibly have applied? Most local employers would fire whomever in their Company incurred such costs with such reasoning! But perhaps loyalty covers all errors. Perhaps.

This is why politics is not about what’s said, but what’s done. It’s the outcome. We are surrounded by far too much ‘specialized knowledge’ and irrelevant ‘terms of discourse’. Experts who have created specialized terms and then act as though that gives them an advantage over us. Good policy must see good results. It’s what we end up with that works to the benefit of all. Isn’t that pragmatism? And if a few don’t get it, we can manage exceptions and make it up to them. Meritocracy, we can use. But those who make the decisions need to have a high commitment to fairness. Not a high commitment to loyalty to themselves, or to their leader. Meritocracy sounds great and we can get everyone to sing the song about it. But that does not make it true. What is happening keeps running along preferential lines.